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Resolving Vulnerability Identification Errors using Security Requirements 
on Business Process Models 
Purpose - In any information security risk assessment, vulnerabilities are usually identified by 
information-gathering techniques. However, vulnerability identification errors - wrongly identified or 
unidentified vulnerabilities - can occur as uncertain data are used. Furthermore, businesses’ security needs 
are not considered sufficiently. Hence, security functions may not protect business assets sufficiently and 
cost-effectively. 
Design/methodology/approach - This paper aims to resolve vulnerability errors by analysing the 
security requirements of information assets in business process models. Business process models have 
been selected for use, because there is a close relationship between business process objectives and risks. 
Security functions are evaluated in terms of the information flow of business processes regarding their 
security requirements. The claim that vulnerability errors can be resolved was validated by comparing the 
results of a current risk assessment approach with the proposed approach. The comparison is conducted 
both at three entities of an insurance company, as well as through a controlled experiment within a survey 
among security professionals. 
Findings - Vulnerability identification errors can be resolved by explicitly evaluating security 
requirements in the course of business; this is not considered in current assessment methods. 
Research limitations/implications - Security requirements should be explicitly evaluated in risk 
assessments considering the business context. Results of any evaluation of security requirements could be 
used to indicate the security of information. The approach was only tested in the insurance domain and 
therefore results may not be applicable to other business sectors. 
Originality/value - It is shown that vulnerability identification errors occur in practice. With the explicit 
evaluation of security requirements, identification errors can be resolved. Risk assessment methods should 
consider the explicit evaluation of security requirements. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, companies rely heavily on information technology (IT) systems to achieve their business 
objectives, making them vulnerable to IT security incidents. Vulnerability can be defined as “a flaw or a 
weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could be 
exercised and result in a security breach or a violation of the system’s security policy” (Stoneburner et al., 
2002). In information security, risk assessment security experts have to rely on uncertainties for threat and 
vulnerability identification, such as threat lists or security-related best practices; this approach often leads 
to errors in identification (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2011). Vulnerability identification errors occur when a 
vulnerability is either wrongly identified or unidentified. These vulnerability identification errors can lead 
to ignoring substantial weaknesses, or investing in inefficient security measures due to wrongly identified 
vulnerabilities. Security reports (CSI, 2009, Verizon, 2010) indicate that flaws in security functions and 
operations still cause losses due to errors in identifying vulnerabilities that are deliberately exploited. 
As a first step in any information security risk assessment, assets, threats and vulnerabilities are identified 
according to standards from Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Committee (AS/NZS), the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC) such as: AS/NZS ISO 31000 (ASNZ, 2009) (formerly AS/NZS 4360 (ASNZ, 1999) and including 
ISO/IEC 31000 (ISO, 2009)); ISO/IEC Guide 73 (ISO, 2002); ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO, 2005a) and 
ISO/IEC 27005 (ISO, 2011). The ISO/IEC 13335-1 (ISO, 2004) defining basic security concepts was 
replaced by ISO/IEC 2700x series. The determination of business processes (Khanmohammadi and 
Houmb, 2010) and information assets (Stevens, 2005) was proposed to establish an asset and its value for 
an organization, while security requirements were introduced (Gerber et al., 2001) to identify the criticality 
of an asset, the impact of the risks and vulnerabilities, as well as the most suitable security mitigations. But 
the methods or guidelines used for vulnerability identification based on common or public security 
practices do not consider enough companies’ specific security requirements (Siponen and Willison, 2009) 
and security requirements are not explicitly evaluated for discovering and resolving vulnerabilities. 
In this paper, a new method for resolving vulnerability identification errors is proposed - namely explicitly 
evaluating security requirements of information assets at business process models. For each information 
asset identified in key business processes, the criticality in the form of security objectives has to be 
determined. Then, requirements for the security objectives have to be elicited and are used to argue for 
the accurate identification of vulnerabilities. In the business process model the entry, processing and 
communication of information assets are identified. At these process points, it is determined whether the 
information asset’s security requirements are adhered to, with regard to security functions. Any non-
adherence represents a vulnerability (in other words, a risk, as in this paper risk is defined as “the non-
adherence to security requirements causing harm to the organization”). The novelty is the explicit 
evaluation of security requirements against the security functions of business process activities, to identify 
vulnerabilities and their business criticality. Through this procedure, vulnerability identification errors 
could be resolved, as business security needs and corresponding security functions are explicitly evaluated 
in the course of operation. Furthermore, security requirements can be used as criteria for result accuracy 
and the security of information, as security requirements define the desired security (Haley et al., 2004). 
This has not yet been considered in risk assessment procedures. 
In a controlled experiment (as part of a survey conducted among 55 security professionals at a security 
conference) it was observed that 20% more errors in vulnerability identification occur in cases where 
security requirements were not considered. In other words, vulnerability identification has been more 
accurate where security requirements were considered.  
Furthermore, an analysis of the risk assessment results of the proposed approach in this paper compared 
to an approach based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 
(SP) 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002) and Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies 
(COBIT) (ITGI, 2007), applied across three insurance companies at the same time, shows that security 
issues were identified at least 18% more accurately. Particularly, business process-related issues were 
identified more effectively; these are more significant risks for a company (Khanmohammadi and Houmb, 
2010). 
The main contribution of this paper is its demonstration that vulnerability identification errors occur in 
practice, and that a security requirement- and process model-based approach can improve the accuracy of 
vulnerability identification. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives 
background on information security risk assessments; section 3 provides a theoretical background for the 
research, as well as explaining the approach in detail. In section 4, validation results are presented and 
discussed. Section 5 is about related work while the paper is concluded with a summary in section 6. 
2. BACKGROUND: INFORMATION SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT 
ISO/IEC 31000 (ISO, 2009), ISO/IEC Guide 73 (ISO, 2002), ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO, 2005a) and 
ISO/IEC 27005 (ISO, 2011) form the basis of any domain-specific information security (IS) risk 
assessment standard, as well as of developed IS risk assessment approaches. These standards specify that 
in the risk assessment phase vulnerabilities should be identified with questions such as “what can 
happen?” and “how and why can this happen?” by using brainstorming, security testing, checklists and 
best practices. For example in ISO/IEC 27005, vulnerabilities are determined by known threats, the asset 
list and existing controls using e.g. vulnerability lists or security testing. Asset valuation, for example by 
costs incurred by a loss, is used to determine the security value of the asset. Determining the scope, 
boundaries and criteria of information security management, referred to as context establishment in 
ISO/IEC 27005, is not discussed in this paper as the focus is on the risk assessment part of the IS risk 
management process. 
Requirements engineering (RE) approaches such as that of Franqueira et al., 2011) show that arguing and 
reasoning of security requirements can be used to identify implementation and design vulnerabilities, as 
well as risks. In current IS risk assessment approaches (see section 5 related work), based on the standards 
mentioned previously, vulnerabilities are identified by known threats, security practices or vulnerability 
lists. But this method of vulnerability identification - comparing security practices or vulnerability lists 
against the current security functions – can only prove the presence of vulnerabilities, but not their 
absence (Wang, 2005). IS risk assessment approaches that define security requirements only use them to 
determine the impact and consequences of vulnerabilities. However, a statement about security - the true, 
accurate value of a measurement system (Viera and Garrett, 2005) - cannot be made, because the security 
needed is not explicitly evaluated in the assessments and vulnerability identification errors can occur. It is 
hypothesised that with an explicit evaluation of security requirements at business process models, 
vulnerability identification errors can be resolved, which occur in practice, and a statement about the 
security of information assets can be provided as the closeness to the accurate value is determined. 
3. BUSINESS PROCESS MODEL-BASED IT SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT 
An information security risk assessment should consider both organizational and technological issues (von 
Solms and von Solms, 2005), providing a company-wide view of risk both as a baseline for improvement, 
as well as a statement of security. By using business process models and evaluating security requirements 
of information assets, one can consider organizational issues as well as identify technological issues and 
provide a statement of security. Information assets can be described as information handled by systems or 
people residing in facilities of organizations. The proposed approach differs at the vulnerability 
identification phase to current risk identification procedures, as information assets’ security requirements 
against security functions are evaluated (instead of using a list of vulnerabilities or security best practices). 
3.1. Overview of the proposed approach 
The approach consists of six steps, organized into four phases, namely asset identification, asset profiling, 
vulnerability identification and document risks. The first phase is identifying critical assets. The second 
phase is defining security objectives and requirements for the assets. The third phase involves evaluating 
the assets vulnerabilities. Finally, the vulnerabilities and risks are documented. Figure 1 shows the 
assessment phases and steps; a rectangle represents a step in the assessment process and the arrows indicate the 
order of the steps. 
In the first phase, ’asset identification’, information assets (Stevens, 2005) are identified with the help of 
business process models of the company’s critical business processes. Business process models describe a 
structured flow of activities of actors (e.g. a human or machine), and applications (systems that perform or 
support an activity) using information assets (data) embedded in an environment (e.g. an organization or 
facilities) (zur Muehlen, 2005). These information asset-representing business transactions can be identified 
by what information is used by actors or applications. Although, Phase one is completed once information 
assets are identified, it does not necessarily require the identification of all assets at the first attempt. This 
activity can be restarted or applied iteratively. 
In the second phase, ‘asset profiling’, security objectives and requirements are defined for each information 
asset. This profiling step establishes clear boundaries for the security required, with regard to the 
processing of information, containers handling the information asset in a process and security processes 
applied - as well as when a vulnerability becomes a risk. Security objectives can be defined as a high-level 
description of the security to be achieved, whilst security requirements are refinements of the security 
objectives as the constraints required for the system to be satisfied (Mead et al., 2005). Artifacts that can be 
used include the companies’ security policy, organizational procedures, as well as security best practices. The 
verification of security requirements with regard to validity and correctness is no objective. Any 
dependencies and inconsistencies between the security needs of information assets can be identified by 
defining and aligning the security requirements for different business processes in which the information 
asset is used. 
In the third phase, ‘vulnerability identification’, the information asset security objectives and requirements 
with regard to implemented security functions are evaluated on the basis of entry, process and 
communication points in the business process model. An entry, process and communication point is an 
activity by an actor or system in the process, where an information asset is created, processed or 
transmitted. With the evaluation of the asset’s security objectives at entry, process and communication 
points, the secure processing (entry, processing and transmission) of the information is determined. With the 
evaluation of the asset’s security requirements at the containers (systems, actors and the environment), the 
secure handling of the information is determined. Containers are systems, actors or the environment utilizing 
the information asset or where information resides. It is postulated that - if security requirements are not 
implemented, not implemented correctly, or not adhered to – it has a negative impact upon the security 
objective and ultimately upon the business requirements and the organization as a whole. Therefore, a risk 
and vulnerability can be identified by a deviation from, or non-adherence to, the security requirement by 
implemented security functions. Security objectives are evaluated by predefined security functions like 
access control or encryption whereas security requirements by their implementation. The assessment is 
completed when all entry, process and communication points of the process are evaluated. Information 
asset identification can be restarted or applied iteratively (the arrow between step 3.2 and 1.2), if a new asset is 
identified in the vulnerability identification phase. 
In the fourth phase, ‘document risks’, vulnerabilities and the information assets at risk are acknowledged 
for each business process. The assessment is completed by documenting the vulnerabilities and risks 
affecting an information asset. 
 
Figure 1.  Security requirements risk assessment approach (SRA). 
3.2.  Running example 
In the following, a real world example is used to demonstrate the applicability of approach in a practical 
and realistic environment. The example process (see Figure 2) is modelled in Business Process Modeling 
Notation (BPMN) (OMG, 2009). Due to page constraints not all intermediate results are presented. 
Process model – online travel insurance quotation: A major part of the turnover of an insurance 
company is created via an online system offering travel insurance. The travel insurance for vacation, 
business trip and time abroad, is concluded when the customer has provided all data (name, address, e-
mail, phone number, date of birth, travel details) and agreed to the terms and conditions of the company. 
Payments can be made via credit card or debit payment and afterwards the insurance contract is sent per 
email and post. The online system is a web application with a connected database storing all data about 
the contract, which has an interface to a third-party service to verify credit card and bank account data as 
well as to the accounting system for payment processing. As this is an example for illustration purposes, it 
is already known (before applying the approach) that the online system has a code injection problem when 
personal data is entered (at process activity 3 ‘- Display product details ...’), and an encryption problem at 
the interface with the third-party service (at process activity 4 ‘Verify personal and payment data’). In 
addition, the information technology (IT) continuity management process is not documented and tested. 
 
Figure 2.  BPMN process model: Online travel insurance quotation  
a. Asset identification phase 
The objective of this phase is to identify the critical business processes (step 1.1) of an organisation and 
the information assets (step 1.2) of these processes. The criticality of the business process can be 
determined by the objective and output of a process and its value for the organization (e.g. a business 
impact analysis, where critical functions of a organization are identified whose disruption is regarded as 
unacceptable, can be used). Criteria and indicators for identifying information assets are the processes 
decision points and process activity descriptions. The online travel insurance quotation process was 
identified as critical with customer and payment data as information assets. 
b. Asset profiling phase 
In the online travel insurance quotation process example, the following information assets were identified: 
customer and payment data. Amongst the information asset-related security requirements, it is 
distinguished between processing and the containers of information assets. For the processing of 
information, a security objective level is defined: low (L1), medium (L2), high (L3); for integrity (I), 
confidentiality (C) and availability (A), specifying the type of security needed (see Table I). For 
information asset containers, one has to define security requirements for the systems, organization and 
physical surroundings, considering the security objective level, as well as the essential IT security processes 
designated guaranteeing the protection of the asset (see Table I, second row from the top). The container 
security requirements refine the processing security objectives and describe what should be protected, as 
well as the concrete implementation. The artifacts used include the companies’ security policy, 
organizational procedures, as well as security best practices for the definition of the requirements and IT 
security processes. 
TABLE I.  INFORMATION ASSET SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
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Primary  
Systems  
(PiSys) 
Address data has to be 
verified in the system.  
Data in the system 
should be protected 
against unauthorized 
access and modification.  
192-bit AES encryption 
if data is transfered 
Access should be 
 given only to  
company people. 
Changes have to be 
logged.  
Within one  
business day 
Access management 
 (authorizations) 
IT security management  
(Seccurity of systems) 
Continuity management  
and disaster recovery 
Change management 
Organisation 
People 
Process 
Personnel entering data 
should verify their 
entries as well as the 
data received.  
People of the  
departments should 
be aware of 
confidentiality.  
Core people 
 within one 
business day. 
Access management 
IT security training 
IT security policy 
Physical none Documents should be 
locked away and 
disposed of securely.  
Within one 
 business day. 
IT security training 
Facility management 
Business continuity 
management 
c. Vulnerability identification phase 
First, the degree of each implemented security functions of the process are evaluated and compared with 
the information assets’ processing level requirements (1). Secondly, the information assets’ containers (2) 
(systems, actors and environment) are evaluated with regard to the information assets’ security 
requirements. 
Evaluation of processing of information assets 
One starts to determine where the information assets in the process are created, processed or transmitted. 
These locations are defined as entry (EP), process (PP) and communication (CC) points (see Figure 3). 
Entry points (EP) describe activities where information available is made processable by its entry into a 
system. Process points (PP) describe activities where data are permanently saved electronically, or 
modified (processed). Communication channels (CC) describe activities where data between process 
activities are transmitted. The EP, PP and CC of information assets were identified by keywords (e.g., 
enter, save, send) of process activity descriptions. Secondly, for each EP, PP and CC the degree of security 
function implementation – such as access control (AC), authorization (A), data input validation (D), 
communication (C) and encryption (E) - is determined, according the levels in Table II. Then, the security 
function implementation rating is compared against the processing requirement of the information assets 
at each EP, PP and CC, using a rule set representing a knowledge base. For example, the rating of access 
control at EP1 (Entry Point 1, rated as AC0 (Access Control level 0)) related to customer data is evaluated 
against the information assets security objective rating integrity level 2 using the rule set. The rule set 
represents security expert knowledge, considering both the security function and any objective level 
dependencies, and is implemented as PROLOG - a logic programming language - facts and rules. Due to 
space limitations any rule set used, or the interim results of the ratings are not included. The rating for an 
EP/PP and CC can be sufficient (ok), insufficient (nok), not/applicable (n/a) or unknown (u). Only for 
the security objective availability, different evaluation criteria were used - such as “level” and “measure”. 
With “level”, it is evaluated how often availability requirements were met in the past, and “measure” 
represents the implemented continuity measures. In the example in this paper (see Figure 4) only CC3 was 
rated as nok because of the missing data encryption. 
 Figure 3.  BPMN process model: Online travel insurance quotation with identified data process points  
EP/PP/CC security implementation    
Access control Authorization Data input 
validation 
Communication Encryption Level Measure 
AC0: Unauthent. 
user 
A0: None D0: None C0: External 
unauthenticated 
partner 
E0: None L0: Never 
met 
M0: none 
AC1: Internal user A1: Read D1: Manual C1: External 
authenticated 
partner 
E1: Weak 
encryption 
L1: Partially 
met 
M1: Cold 
standby 
AC2: Authent. 
user  
A2: Execute/ 
process 
D2: Downstream 
validation 
C2: Internal 
network partner 
E2: Standard 
encryption 
L2: Partially 
not met 
M2: Hot 
standby 
AC3: System user A3: Write/ 
update 
D3: Value 
verification 
C3: Internal 
authenticated 
partner 
E3: Strong 
encryption 
L3: Always 
met 
M3: 
Redundancy 
  A4: Full 
control 
D4: Value 
verification and 
completeness     
M4: Cluster 
EP/PP/CC rating    
Not applicable (n/a), Unknown (u), insufficient (nok), sufficient (ok) 
TABLE II.  EP, PP, CC RATING CRITERIA 
Evaluation of containers of information assets 
The containers’ security requirements are evaluated by the security expert at each process activity where 
data processing (at EPs and PPs) takes place. CCs are evaluated between activities and evidence for 
security requirement adherence can be gathered from the system configuration/specification, the 
company’s security policy, process documentation or examples of implementation. IT processes are 
evaluated by system testing and process performance documentation reviews. In the example in this 
paper, the PiSys at EP2, PP1 and CC3 were evaluated as ‘nok’ because of the incorrect system 
implementation - the data modification via code injection and the missing data encryption. Furthermore, 
at CC3, payment data processing was affected by the encryption issue and therefore rated as ‘nok’. The IT 
process review for customer data at the contract system resulted in the IT continuity process as a whole 
being rated as ‘nok’, because documentation and testing of the continuity process was missing.  
Figure 4 illustrates the BPMN order process’ evaluation results, for processing as well as for container 
security requirements. A BPMN textual annotation is used to document the evaluation results at every 
process activity, and a BPMN data object for information assets to show consolidated results. 
 
Figure 4.  BPMN process model: Online travel insurance quotation process with evaluation information 
d. Risk result documentation phase 
At the end of the assessment, the risk results of the assessed information assets at the business processes are 
consolidated and presented as a matrix with the information asset at risk as the x-axis and the 
business/security process and issue identified as the y-axis. By this presentation, an overview of the 
information asset at risk at the different business/security processes can be indicated. At the online travel 
insurance quotation process, customer and payment data are vulnerable to code injections and encryption 
is missing. Additionally, the security process performance of the IT continuity management process was 
evaluated as insufficient, affecting both information assets. 
4. VALIDATION AND DISCUSSION  
This chapter presents the validation of the approach by testing and a controlled experiment. 
4.1. Vulnerability identification accuracy 
With testing on real world examples, it has been verified that the approach is reliable (to produce the same 
results) and accurate (conformity to the results), determining vulnerabilities. 
Context: IT security risk assessments are performed by two security experts at subsidiaries of a global 
insurance company, lasting one week at a maximum. The approach used is based on NIST SP 800-30 
(Stoneburner et al., 2002) using COBIT (ITGI, 2007) control objectives and ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO, 
2005a). IT staff are interviewed about security, and security scanning is conducted on systems. Security 
subject areas are selected based on importance, compliance requirements and common vulnerabilities. 
Systems used, underlying infrastructure, and the systems management are all examined; risks are 
determined and qualified by their significance (low, medium or high). The approach is performed along 
the NIST SP 800-30 risk assessment process. Threat- /Vulnerability identification and control analysis are 
performed by using vulnerability scanning tools, vulnerability lists and selected COBIT (ITGI, 2007) and 
ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO, 2005a) control objectives, evaluating implementation of controls. This approach is 
called the audit/risk assessment approach (ARA). 
Proceeding: Both the ARA and the security requirements approach (SRA) proposed in this paper were 
applied, see section 3 for details, to a set of business processes (claims, accounting and underwriting) and 
systems of three distinct insurance entities. Each of the entities’ IT departments operates directory, file, e-
mail and application servers, as well as their internet access, and is connected to the corporate network; 
headquarters provide guidelines for IT security and system standardization. Each local IT department 
consists of about 20 to 30 people responsible for service desk, desktops and server operations. 
Application development does not take place. Business processes were available for the evaluated 
processes and process activities were similar because of the business model, but the level of detail and 
modelling of the processes differed between entities. At the first entity, the ARA and SRA were applied 
successively, twice, by one assessor. The ARA was applied successively by two experienced assessors, and 
the SRA by an experienced one and a naïve one. At the second and third entities, the ARA and SRA were 
performed by the same people - now acting as team. The teams did not change and they conducted the 
assessments subsequently at the three entities. The ARA and SRA teams had to specify the significance for 
the issues identified. There was no interaction between the teams after each assessment. 
Results: At the end of each assessment, all results of the ARA and SRA were collected and common risk 
identifiers created to be able to compare results and facilitate easier result presentation. These common 
risk identifiers were created by the area and issue identified in the ARA. Tables III, IV and V represent the 
assessment results of the ARA and SRA at the three entities by these common risk identifiers. Each table 
presents the issues identified at the entities by business areas, whether the issues was identified at the ARA or 
SRA by a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, and the significance of the issue by a low, medium or high rating of the assessor(s). Any 
differences in the significance rating of the assessors were resolved by taking the highest rating. Table III 
contains the ARA and SRA assessments results of four assessors while tables IV and V contain the ARA and 
SRA assessment results of the two different assessment teams. Furthermore, for comparison reasons, the 
percentages and number of identified and unidentified vulnerabilities (with the rating of the ARA/SRA) 
were determined as well as the relative accuracy of the approaches at the three entities (see Table VI and 
discussion section).  
Company 1 Results ARA ARA Significance SRA SRA Significance 
1. Claims area       
1.1 The claims specialist has unrestricted access 
in the claims system. 
Yes Yes Medium Yes Yes High 
1.2 There are no claims limits set up in the 
system. 
No No - Yes Yes High 
1.3 There is no authorization activity in the 
process. 
No No - Yes No High 
2. Accounting area       
2.1 Accountants can authorize bookings in the 
system but should not be possible. 
No No - Yes No High 
2.2 Data transfer between the bank and the 
company is insecure as only a weak encryption 
is used. 
Yes Yes Medium Yes Yes Medium 
3. Underwriting area       
3.1 There is no treaty data verification in the 
treaty system. 
No No - Yes Yes Low 
4. General issues       
4.1 The operating system of the accounting 
system misses several patches. 
Yes Yes High Yes Yes Medium 
4.2 The firewall is not properly configured; 
websites are not blocked.  
Yes Yes Medium No No - 
4.3 Unused and active administrative accounts 
in MS Active Directory. 
Yes No Low No No - 
4.4. Staff are not aware about IS threats. Yes Yes Low Yes Yes Low 
4.5 There is no appropriate disaster recovery 
and business continuity documentation. 
Yes Yes Medium Yes Yes Medium 
4.6 Paper documents were not securely stored in 
the Claims Department. 
Yes Yes Low Yes Yes Medium 
4.7 Internal oral communication in the claims 
process was identified as not secure but assessed 
as uncritical. 
No No - Yes No Low 
TABLE III.  COMPANY 1 RESULTS 
 
Company 2 Results ARA Significance SRA Significance 
1. Claims area     
1.1 The claims specialist is able to release claims without 
authorizations in the system. 
No - Yes High 
1.2 Process of claims data entry is inappropriate due to missing 
claims information. 
No - Yes High 
1.3 Used spreadsheets for claims calculation - no access and change 
controls. 
No - Yes Medium 
1.4 Claims data received were not properly checked. No - Yes Medium 
2. Underwriting area     
2.1 Missing alignment between Underwriter and Actuarial services 
for contract pricing. 
No - Yes Medium 
2.2 Broker approval process was to work as designed. No - Yes Medium 
2.3 Missing authorization for underwriting policy deviations No - Yes High 
3. General issues     
3.1 Weak VPN connection used by IT staff. Yes Medium No - 
3.2 No updated disaster recovery plan. Yes Medium Yes Low 
3.3 No testing of the BCM/DR activities.  Yes Medium Yes Medium 
3.4 System access approval process not adequate.  Yes Medium Yes Medium 
3.5 Daily data centre operations procedure not adhered to. Yes Medium Yes Medium 
3.6 Unused and active administrative accounts in MS Active 
Directory. 
Yes Low No - 
3.7 Data owner not aware of responsibilities. Yes Low Yes Low 
3.8 Unused and active accounts in the HR application. Yes Medium No - 
3.9 Paper documents were not securely stored. Yes Low Yes Low 
3.10 No audit trail logging activated on database level. Yes High No - 
TABLE IV.  COMPANY 2 RESULTS 
 
Company 3 Results ARA Significance SRA Significance 
1. Claims area     
1.1 There is no authorization activity in the claims process. No - Yes Medium 
2. Underwriting area     
2.1 Review and release of quotations in the system were not in line. 
No system-supported authorization process.  
No - Yes High 
2.2 Inaccurate data from systems are used in the expected loss ratio 
studies. 
No - Yes High 
2.3 Inappropriate use of spreadsheets for the calculation of 
premiums. 
No - Yes High 
2.4 Local actuary model not aligned with central model. No - Yes Medium 
3. General issues     
3.1 Shared account used for the online banking system  Yes High Yes Medium 
3.2 The operating systems for various servers are missing several Yes High Yes Medium 
patches. 
3.3 No business continuity and disaster recovery plan in place Yes Medium Yes Medium 
3.4 Unused and active administrative accounts in MS Active 
Directory. 
Yes Medium No - 
3.5 No user access lists for local applications. Yes Low Yes Low 
3.6 Unused and active accounts in the HR application Yes Medium No - 
3.7 Paper documents were not securely stored. Yes Low Yes Low 
3.8 No configuration management existent Yes Medium Yes Medium 
3.9 Weak passwords for the backup recovery tool Yes Medium No - 
3.10 The security incident process was not adhered to Yes Medium Yes Medium 
3.11 Confidential information exchanged via internet No - Yes Medium 
TABLE V.  COMPANY 3 RESULTS 
 
  Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
No. total identified vulnerabilities  13 17 16 
 ARA SRA ARA SRA ARA SRA 
No. identified vulnerabilities  8 11 10 13 10 13 
Relative accuracy on total identified vulnerabilities in 
% 
62% 85% 59% 76% 63% 81% 
Overlap between ARA and SRA – no. / in % 6 / 46% 6 / 35% 7 / 44% 
No. identified high vulnerabilities (in %) 1 (12%) 4 (36%) 1 (10%) 3 (23%) 2 (20%) 3 (23%) 
No. identified medium vulnerabilities (in %) 4 (50%) 4 (36%) 6 (60%) 7 (54%) 6 (60%) 8 (62%) 
No. identified low vulnerabilities (in %) 3 (38%) 3 (28%) 3 (30%) 3 (23%) 2 (20%) 2 (15%) 
No. unidentified high vulnerabilities 3 0 3 1 3 0 
No. unidentified medium vulnerabilities 0 1 4 2 3 3 
No. unidentified low vulnerabilities 2 1 0 1 0 0 
TABLE VI.  OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 
4.2. Vulnerability identification errors 
To demonstrate that vulnerability identification errors occur and can be resolved by using security 
requirements, a controlled experiment was conducted included in a survey about security risk assessment 
procedures at an information security conference of professionals in the ‘D-A-CH’ region (Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland). The conference was about information security trends, threats and assessments. In 
the controlled experiment, participants had to assess the risks of a constructed example. Both the survey 
and controlled experiment were administrated by the present researchers. Because of space restrictions, 
the detailed controlled experiment description provided to the participants is not included in the paper. 
Design: In the controlled experiment, each third of the conference participants (in total 55 security 
professionals) had to identify risks in a constructed example based on threats; based on threats and a 
business process model; and based on threats, security requirements and a business process model 
respectively. Each third of the participants were provided randomly with one of three alternative sets of 
information representing the variables of the experiment. In case A (12 of 20 distributed forms were 
evaluable) a risk/threat description was provided, in case B (13 of 15 distributed forms were evaluable) the 
risk/threat description with a business process model was provided and in case C (11 of 20 distributed 
forms were evaluable) the risk/threat description with security requirements and a business process model 
were provided. The participants had to determine risks based on the information available. In cases A and 
B there were two predefined risks and in case C there were three additional predefined risks (see Table 
VII, risks 1 to 5) which was described in the threat (risks 1 and 2) and security requirement (risks 3,4 and 
5) description. 
Procedure: The controlled experiment was conducted with all 55 security professionals of the conference 
in a closed room and for the completion of the risk assessment, 30 minutes were available. A closed room 
was used so as not to disturb participants by any other people, or those leaving the experiment early. 
Interaction with other participants was not allowed and the survey instructor’s involvement was limited to 
questions on how to fill out the template. All participants were security professionals responsible for 
information security in their companies, or security consultants and therefore knowledgable about security 
risks. 
Results:  
 Identified Risks in percentages 
 Case A Case B Case C 
Analysed responses 12 13 11 
Predefined Risks identified    
1.Data integrity (in example A, B and C) 100% 100% 73% 
2. Data confidentiality (in example A, B and C) 67% 85% 91% 
3. Process design data confidentiality access control (only example C) 8% 0% 45% 
4. System availability (only example C) 100% 85% 100% 
5. Process design authorization (only example C) 0% 0% 20% 
6. Other identified risks (in example  A, B und C) 75% 77% 55% 
TABLE VII.  EXPERIMENT RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
In case A the participants identified the predefined risks one and two by 100% and 67% (see table VII). 
All participants (100%) identified an availability risk that was not present; three out of four participants 
identified multiple other risks that were not present. In case B, predefined risks one and two were 
identified by 100% and 85% of participants, respectively. The non-existent availability risk was now only 
identified by 85%, but three out of four participants also identified multiple other risks that were not 
present. In case C 75% and 91% of participants identified the predefined risks one and two respectively, 
and 45%, 100% and 20% recognised risks three to five. Other risks were identified by 55%. 
 
4.3. Discussion of the results 
Vulnerability result accuracy at the ARA and SRA 
To compare accuracy, one must know the true value. But as one does not know all existing vulnerabilities 
in these real world examples, it is hypothesised that all identified vulnerabilities in both approaches 
represent the relative accurate value. Whether all existing vulnerabilities are resolved cannot be verified, as 
a natural language for security requirements is used and the assessment is a manual process which is error-
prone. 
The relative accuracy and significance of vulnerabilities is used to determine accuracy. The relative accuracy varies 
between 18% and 23% higher accuracy for the SRA in all 3 cases, and is always constant above 76%. The 
SRA reliably identifies more vulnerabilities than the ARA. The overlap of 35-46% of the same identified 
vulnerabilities at the ARA and SRA with regard to the total number of vulnerabilities is attributed to the 
fact that the SRA identifies more process security issues whereas the ARA is more technically-focused. 
Using system scanning tools would improve identifying technical issues in the SRA, but tool-based 
vulnerability identification is time-consuming and momentum is lost (Caralli et al., 2007).  
Further on, the vulnerabilities’ significance using a distribution analysis was analysed. On average, 78% and 
71% of all identified vulnerabilities are rated high or medium by SRA and ARA respectively. The risk 
significance distribution lies within the expected range of other approaches (Buyens et al., 2007) as well as 
the ARA result distribution within the 5-year historic data of 24 assessments with a higher tendency for 
low ratings as reported by others (Buyens et al., 2007). This study on the distribution of risk results 
indicates that assessment methods behave differently in the classification of threats. However, the study 
examined not whether one of the approaches has identified significantly more threats as another 
approach. The total number of unidentified vulnerabilities shows that the ARA missed 9 (20%) and the 
SRA one (2%) high-rated vulnerabilities, out of a total of 46. With the SRA approach a high accuracy on 
business process-related issues, as well as high-rated vulnerabilities can be achieved. Any other developed 
approaches would not perform better, as they are based on assessments standards of section 2 using 
security best practices and vulnerability lists for vulnerability identification, like in the ARA approach. 
Asset-specific security requirements are not evaluated to determine accuracy by these approaches. With 
the SRA, there are 15-28% low-rated vulnerabilities which one would not have expected because of the 
security requirements definition only identifying significant ones.  
An inter-rater reliability analysis using Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960) was performed for the ARA and SRA 
results at company one, determining consistency between raters, and was found to be 0.45 for the SRA 
and 0.51 for the ARA. This ratings represent a moderate agreement (Landis and Koch, March 1977) for 
both raters in both approaches, indicating the consensus was more than due to chance. In general, it is 
difficult to attain an almost perfect agreement between raters for risk assessments as the risk assessment 
procedure to be followed is an informal one, relying on the assessors’ experience and natural language 
descriptions of vulnerabilities and security requirements. 
For the comparative analysis between the ARA and SRA results, one risk identifier had to be created and 
assigned which could have influenced the results of both approaches. This affects both approaches, 
assuming that it holds no advantage for either one of the approaches. One has to be aware that the SRA in 
this paper was tested only in one business sector at three companies. This may prevent generalizations, to 
some degree, for other business sectors. But the sample size is not unusual for this type of research, as often 
only one real world example is used by other researchers. 
Vulnerability identification errors in the controlled experiment 
The experiment risk results show that in all three cases - A, B and C - other risks were identified by between 
55% and 77% of the participants (see table VII). In case B, the process model information supported 
study participants by identifying vulnerabilities more precisely; e.g., the increase of 18% in risk 2 and a 
decrease of 15% in risk 4. In case C, where security requirements were provided additionally, the 
identification of non-existent risks decreased (from 75% to 55%), but complexity negatively influenced the 
risk identification rate. Risk 5 was identified by 20% of participants and in risk 1, the rate decreased to 
27% due to having to identify multiple risks. But in all cases, more vulnerabilities were identified as 
existent because assessors used tacit information and knowledge about security requirements as well as 
vulnerabilities. 
The response rate was 60% in cases A and C but 87% in case B. Some of the forms were not filled or 
completed in a way so that results were not usable. The process model supported the participants to be 
able to evaluate risks, represented by a higher return rate. Case A was unusual as the risk description was 
represented clearly and easy to understand. The low response rate in case C can be attributed to the 
complexity of the risk assessment example as the variable of the controlled experiment had to be changed. 
In case C, the variable of the controlled experiment, the predefined risks, caused complexity. Additional 
risks in case C had to be created in comparison to A and B, to verify whether participants can identify 
vulnerabilities by the security requirement definition and not only by the risk description. This caused the 
accuracy of risks 1 and 2 to decrease slightly, as well as other risks being identified in case C. 
The error rate - defined as non-existent risks identified per participant in the experiment - was: in case 
A=2.1; in B=1.6; and in case C=0.55. A participant in case A identified 1.5 times as many non-existent 
additional risks than one in case C. The business process model and security requirements provided 
helped the participants to identify risks more accurately - identifying the correct set of risks in the 
experiment. 
The experiment participants had various competence levels in risk analysis and security assessments, which 
were determined by the survey beforehand, and therefore, participants were well aware of risk assessment 
concepts. 
5. RELATED WORK 
In early risk assessment approaches, the idea of using business processes was introduced to avoid focusing 
solely on technical security issues (CCTA, 1987, Halliday et al., 1996, Rainer et al., 1991). Later, annual loss 
expectancy (Suh and Han, 2003), loss of disruption (Neubauer et al., 2005) and business goals 
(Khanmohammadi and Houmb, 2010) began to be used to determine the criticality and importance of 
vulnerabilities in terms of losses or interruption. In these approaches the impact of a given vulnerability is 
determined but not the security required. 
Approaches, like Méthode Harmonisée d'Analyse de Risques (MEHARI) - Harmonised Risk Analysis -
(CLUSIF, 2010) or the Livermore Risk Analysis Methodology (Guarro, 1987), use risk scenarios to 
determine risks. A risk scenario comprises a threat, frequency and impact and is constructed by 
determining exactly what could befall a system. Mostly threat lists or security best practices are used for 
describing vulnerabilities in risk scenarios; these are then evaluated against the implementation of security 
controls. Several other approaches describe organisation-agnostic security solutions to be implemented 
and the security principles to be applied as well as common threats and vulnerabilities. For example, 
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT) (ITGI, 2007), Standard of good 
practice for information security (ISF, 2005), Baseline Protection Manual (BSI, 2008), Generally Accepted 
Information Security Principles (GAISP) (ISSA, 2004) or ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO, 2005b). In CORAS 
(Stølen et al., 2002), a Platform for Risk Analysis of Security Critical Systems, threat and vulnerability 
modelling alongside with threat diagrams and structured brainstorming is used to identify risks. These 
approaches suggest applying common security principles or security best practices, or using modelling. 
They do not determine and evaluate specific security needs of assets to identify risks. 
Over time security requirements were proposed (Gerber and von Solms, 2005, Gerber et al., 2001) for 
determing security controls with regard to the security needs. In the approaches of Innerhofer-
Oberperfler and Breu (Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu, 2006), Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) (Alberts et al., 2003), OCTAVE Allegro (Caralli et al., 2007), 
Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité (EBIOS) - Expression of Needs and 
Identification of Security Objectives - (ANSSI, 2010) security requirements are used to determine the 
criticality and impact of vulnerabilities as well as for the selection of security solutions. In these 
approaches, “existing security checklists or standards like the Baseline Protection Manual [BSI03] or 
EBIOS [DCS05]” (Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu, 2006): 9) or “brainstorming about possible 
conditions or situations that can threaten an organization’s information assets” (Caralli et al., 2007): 18) 
can be used for vulnerability identification. In NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002), vulnerability 
knowledge bases, system security testing and a security requirements’ checklist are all used for vulnerability 
identification. The security checklist specifies only basic security standards (e.g., from government 
regulations or security directives). In EBIOS (ANSSI, 2010), threats are identified based on attack 
methods, and are then combined with security requirements to determine the impact. At Common 
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC, 2006), a product-oriented approach, 
security requirements are used to evaluate a product or specification and to provide assurance that it meets 
the requirements. Although these approaches use security requirements, they determine only the impact of 
vulnerabilities by security requirements or only the requirements of a product; or using asset unspecific 
security standards. 
In business process modelling approaches, security requirements are elicited and assigned to a business 
process, before the best security solution is identified by comparison with existing security catalogues or 
solutions (Herrmann and Herrmann, 2006, Roehrig and Knorr, 2004). These approaches focus on 
identifying and applying the best security solution for a business process, but not on evaluating the current 
security implementation. 
On the other hand, in requirements engineering (RE) modelling languages are used to elicit, model and 
analyse security requirements based on security goals, threats or vulnerabilities identified beforehand. For 
example, catalogues of common weaknesses and attack patterns have been used to argue for security 
requirements (Franqueira et al., 2011) based on satisfaction arguments (Haley et al., 2008). Houmb et al, 
(2010) uses Common Criteria, Heuristics and UMLsec - an extension to the Unified Modelling Language 
(UML) - to elicit security requirements and map them to the design. However, RE approaches address 
security issues in the early phases of system development, their modelling languages unable to represent 
risk (Dubois et al., 2010) and are therefore not suitable for assessing a companies’ risks. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Vulnerability identification errors occur as security experts have to rely on uncertain inputs as well as 
company-unspecific security practices. The controlled experiment results confirmed that up to 75% of the 
assessors identify one or multiple vulnerabilities that are not existent, as assessors make tacit assumptions 
about risks (Asnar and Zannone, 2008). 
A key contribution of this work is that it was demonstrated that a security requirement and process model 
based approach can improve the accuracy of vulnerability identification. Security issues were identified 
18% more accurately with a security requirements approach. Especially business-related security issues 
were identified more accurately, and these are more significant risks for the company (Khanmohammadi 
and Houmb, 2010). In a controlled experiment, vulnerability identification errors decreased by 20% using 
business process models and security requirements. The results show that the evaluation of security 
requirements in combination with process models helps to achieve a higher accuracy in analysing 
significant risks; such evaluations are hardly used for identifying vulnerabilities in current risk assessment 
approaches. But as the SRA was only tested in the insurance domain, results may not be applicable to other 
business sectors. 
However, a security requirement-based approach has the advantage of making tacit domain security 
knowledge of the security expert and company-specific requirements explicit and being evaluated. This is 
usually not reflected in applying security best practices or vulnerability lists (Siponen and Willison, 2009). 
More accurate vulnerability identification has the benefit of not applying any insufficient security measures 
and allows the creation of a statement about the security of a company - the presence and absence of 
vulnerabilities - which cannot be done by security testing (Wang, 2005). It is suggested to include the 
explicit evaluation of security requirements in risk assessment proceedings to achieve more accurate 
results. But vulnerability identification will still be an informal process relying on the security expert as 
well as on the interpretation of descriptions in natural language. 
To our knowledge, no significant work has addressed vulnerability identification at business process 
activities explicitly evaluating security requirements of information assets. 
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